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A couple of days ago I wrote a piece about Steve Spurrier and his extremely aggressive fourth down play calling during the 2011 season. After a back-and-forth with tryptic67 in the comments section, it occurred to me that the data I presented didn't necessarily mean a lot without the proper context. Namely, we need to know how many opportunities Spurrier had to go for it on forth down as well as the Gamecocks' relative strength in each of the three phases of the game.
I've tried to capture that information in the table below.
Year | Total 4th Downs | 4th Down Attempts | Go For It % | Off. Rank | Def. Rank | ST Rank |
2011 | 86 | 28 | 32.6% | 37 | 12 | 112 |
2010 | 84 | 6 | 7.1% | 16 | 13 | 18 |
2009 | 113 | 24 | 21.2% | 92 | 15 | 94 |
2008 | 97 | 18 | 18.5% | 91 | 19 | 51 |
2007 | 93 | 17 | 18.3% | 44 | 30 | 54 |
It's interesting to note that Spurrier was least aggressive on fourth down in 2010, the year in which he had he not only had his best offense but also his best special teams unit. He's been most aggressive in 2011, a year in which his special teams unit has been among the worst in the country.
So maybe the answer to the question of why Spurrier went for it so much this year on fourth down lies in his desire to mask his team's greatest weakness.
Also, looking at those defensive rankings makes me upset all over again about Ellis Johnson leaving.
The Offense/Defense/Special Teams rankings that I used come from Football Outsiders' F/+ rankings.